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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ARBITRATION -

ARBITRATOR IN COMMERCIAL ARBI-

DISCLOSURE -

TRATION PROCEEDING HELD

To JUDICIAL

STANDARDS OF IMPARTIALITY.-

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968).
In a tripartite commercial arbitration proceeding involving a
prime contractor and a subcontractor, the supposedly "neutral" arbitrator failed to disclose his prior business transactions with the prime
contractor. Subsequently, the subcontractor discovered the undisclosed
relationship, and, conceding the fairness and impartiality of the arbitrator, moved to have the award vacated under Section 10 of the United
States Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
courts, held disclosure of any questionable relationship to be a prerequisite to the impartial hearing which Congress sought to insure
through section 10.
The process of arbitration, one of the oldest and most prevalent
means of settling disputes,' is the consensual submission of a controversy to party-appointed judges who are empowered to render a binding and legally enforceable award. 2 Such self-regulation, encouraged by
the courts as a natural right of man,3 has proven an effective and expeditious substitute for the lengthy and expensive process of litigation. 4
At common law, although executory arbitration agreements were
not specifically enforceable, awards were invariably upheld by the
courts.5 In order to effectuate the intent of the parties, awards were
1

See F. YELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION,

ITS HISTORY, FUNCIONS AND AcHiEvEMENTs 3

(1948); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLum. L. RFy. 846, 854 (1961).
2 Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1959) gives the most
widely quoted definition of arbitration:
Broadly speaking, arbitration is a contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to
any controversy or dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of the matter involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent submit
their controversy to such judges for determination, in the place of the tribunals provided by the ordinary processes of law.
See also In re Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (1902); 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1434, at 397; Wv. Sturges, Arbitration- What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. R1v. 1031, 1032 (1960).
The essence of commercial arbitration is that the parties voluntarily agree in advance
that the avard will be final and binding. See M. DomE, THE LAWv Am PRAcrIxc or ComMERcAL A~rmrAToN 1 (1968). Commercial arbitration must be distinguished from mediation and conciliation, neither of which is binding upon the parties. "Mediation recommends, arbitration decides." Id. at 3. Commercial arbitration also differs. from compulsory
arbitration in which the parties are required by law to submit disputed issues to a third
party for resolution. See Note, Ad Hoc Compulsory Arbitration Statutes: The New Device
For Settling NationalEmergency LaborDisputes, 1968 DoE LJ. 905, 906-07.
3 See F.
(1948).
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4 See Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 399 (1875).

5 See 6 S. WULrns'ON, CoNMACrs § 1929A, at 5398 (rev. ed. 1938).
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deemed final and conclusive, absent direct evidence of corruption,
partiality, or gross misconduct. 6 The arbitrator was deemed judge of
both law and fact, and mere mistake with respect to either was not a
7
sufficient ground for vacation of the award.
This favorable disposition was adopted in the legislation promulgated to further enhance the judicial position of the arbitration agreement.8 The United States Arbitration Act,9 enacted to regulate disputes
concerning interstate and maritime transactions, serves as an excellent
example of the courts' limited power of review over arbitration proceedings; and section 10 of the Act specifically enumerates those
grounds upon which a federal court is empowered to vacate an award. 10
Although earlier courts had strictly construed similar statutory provisions delineating the scope of judicial review," modem statutes have
been afforded a more liberal construction. Indeed, the courts soon
evinced an inclination to insure to the parties in an arbitration proceeding the fair and impartial hearing inherent in judicial proceedings.
In setting aside awards, courts began to refer to arbitrators as judicial
6 See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349-50 (1854); Brush v. Fisher, 70 Mich.
469, 38 N.W. 446 (1888); 6A A. Commns, CoNTRAars § 1433, at 394-95.
7In Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 400 (1875), the court held
that "arbitrators may, unless restricted by the submission, disregard strict rules of law or
evidence and decide according to their sense of equity." See also Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 344, 349 (1854).
8 The first of the modem arbitration acts was the New York Arbitration Act of 1920
(formerly C.P.A. § 1448 et seq., now C.P.L.R. Art. 75). The New York act was the model
for, and is substantially indistinguishable from, the United States Arbitration Act of 1925.
See S. REI. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1925) wherein it is stated: "The bill, while
relating to maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce,
follows the lines of the New York Arbitration Law enacted in 1920 ......
99 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947), formerly 43 Stat. 885 (1925).
109 U.S.C. § 10 (1947), formerly 43 Stat. 885 (1925), provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of
any party to the arbitration(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
mhterial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
For an in-depth analysis of statutory grounds for vacation of an arbitrator's award, see
Rothstein, Vacation of Awards for Fraud,Bias, Misconduct and Partiality,10 VAw. L. Rxv.
813 (1957); Note, Arbitration Awards Vacated for Disqualification of an Arbitrator, 9
SYRACUsF L. REv. 56 (1958).
11 See, e.g., In re Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 498-99, 62 N.E. 575, 577 (1902).
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or quasi-judicial officers, thus suggesting the imposition of judicial
standards of impartiality. For example, in In re Friedman,12 the appellate division of New York unmistakably declared that "the law is
well settled that arbitrators exercise judicial functions, and while not
eo nomine judges, they are, in fact, judicial officers and bound by the
same rules as govern such officers."' 18 In Friedman there had been
neither evident partiality nor any other statutory ground for vacation;
rather, the case merely involved a monetary transaction between the
arbitrator and one party.'4 Nevertheless, the court set aside the award,
stating that "[e]very litigant is not only entitled to present his claims
to an impartial judge, but to one who by no act on his part has justified
a doubt as to his impartiality."' 15 In light of the non-reviewable nature
of arbitration, the court reasoned that
every safeguard possible should be thrown about the proceedings to
insure the utmost fairness and impartiality of those charged with the
determination of the rights of the parties. Nothing should be permitted
to throw suspicion even upon the entire impartiality of arbitrators. 16
In effect, the courts were creating another ground, in addition to
those set forth in the statute, upon which vacation of an award could
be posited. Consequently, nullification of an award would be justified
by discovery of any evidence indicative of an unfair or partial hearing.
However, this did not mean that courts could freely tamper with
awards, for regular intervention would negate an essential element
of the arbitration process - its finality.' 7 Nor did it subject the arbitrators' decision to scrutiny with regard to law or fact.' 8 Rather, the courts
were simply given the opportunity to decide whether any relationship
12 215 App. Div. 130, 213 N.Y.S. 369 (1st Dep't 1926).

13 Id. at 134, 213 N.Y.S. at 373.
14 During the course of the arbitration proceeding one of the parties loaned the

arbitrator five thousand dollars.
1'215 App. Div. at 135, 213 N.Y.S. at 374.
16 Id. at 136, 213 N.Y.S. at 376.
17 In Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 400 (1875), the court warned
that judicial interference with arbitrators' awards increased the danger that arbitration
"[i]nstead of being a final determination of a controversy would become but one of the

steps in its progress." See also Newark Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,
397 F.2d 594, 598 (3d Cir. 1968), wherein the court held:
The statute was not intended to overthrow the general advantage of speedy and
effective decision of disputes by arbitration and the creation of these general grounds
[for vacation] does not obliterate the hesitation with which the courts should view
efforts to re-examine awards.
18 The arbitrator has remained the unreviewable judge of law and fact. See Textile

Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1961); Amicizia Societa
Nay. v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine S. Corp., 274 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1960). But see Newark
Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning Ledger, 397 F.2d 594, 600 (3d Cir. 1968), where the
court indicates that mistakes as to law or fact may be grounds for vacation if the mistake

affects the fairness of the proceeding as a whole.
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which existed between the arbitrator and one party might prejudice
the rights of the other party. Full disclosure of the relationship would
preclude subsequent attack, since a failure to object would amount to
free acceptance of the arbitrator with continued faith in his objectivity.'19 The problem arises when the suspicious relationship is discovered subsequent to the award, for an analysis of the cases discloses
that the judiciary has established no criteria for determining whether
or not a particular relationship is sufficiently substantial to warrant
vacation. Instead, the judiciary has proceeded upon an individual basis,
adjudging each case on its own facts. The results have been rather
nebulous, since seemingly similar cases have been resolved inconsistently. A number of awards have been vacated because of the arbitra20
tor's failure to disclose a prior or contemporary business relationship,
while others have been confirmed because the relationship alleged was
21
too vague and remote or lacked evident partiality.
In Knickerbocker Textile Corp. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc.,2 2 a New York
court attempted to define and extend the judicial position on arbitral
disclosure. For the first time, the court considered failure to disclose
as an independent ground for vacation, rather than as mere prima facie
evidence of partiality. While presuming the arbitrator to be fair and
unbiased, the court stated:
The principle involved is broader than the correctness of the arbitrators'
decision. The concern here is with policy rather than expediency; with
the fundamental spirit and objective of the law rather than a punctilious
23
adherence to its letter.
19 It is well established that failure to raise a timely objection to improprieties arising
during the arbitration proceeding will act as a waiver. Petrol Corp. v. Groupement D'Achat
Des Carburants, 84 F. Supp. 446, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Brush v. Fisher, 70 Mich. 469, 476-77,
38 N.W. 446, 450 (1888); In re Milliken Woolens, 11 App. Div. 2d 166, 168, 202 N.Y.S.2d
431,434 (1961).
20 See American Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1934) (business relationship
warranted vacating award as inherently partial); Rogers v. Shering Corp., 165 F. Supp. 295
(D.C.N.J. 1958) (arbitrator had actually disclosed his prior relationship to the American
Arbitration Association, which neglected to inform the other party); In re Milliken
Woolens, 11 App. Div. 2d 166, 202 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1961) (arbitrator had previously been one
party's attorney).
21 See Ilios Shipping and Trading Corp. v. American Anth. & Bit. Coal Corp., 148
F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957) (arbitrator was employee of company which insured one party); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp.
123 (E.D. Ky. 1959) (counsel for one party was also counsel for a bank of which the
arbitrator was an officer); Meinig Co. v. Katakura & Co., 241 App. Div. 406, 272 N.Y.S. 735
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 418, 195 N.E. 134 (1934) (arbitrator was officer of company dealing
with one party); Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 240 N.Y.S. 436 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
254 N.Y. 546, 173 N.E. 859 (1930) (arbitrator was in same business as the parties).
22 172 Misc. 1015, 16 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939), aff'd mem., 259 App.
Div. 992, 20 N.Y.S.2d 985 (lst Dep't 1940).
23 Id. at 1017, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
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Despite the arbitrator's high character and freedom from bias, the court
asserted that he was obliged to reveal any connection with one party,
thus affording the other an opportunity to object. Citing Friedman, the
court concluded that the arbitrator's failure to disclose the prior relationship was sufficient to disqualify him as an impartial judge.
Although Knickerbocker should have solidified the position of the
courts, confusion has continued to dominate the area. Failing to formulate a stringent policy in favor of disclosure, the courts have been
compelled to resort to an amorphous standard. In 1962, a New York
appellate court further attempted to define the disqualifying relationship in Cross Propertiesv. Gimbel Bros.,2 4 wherein it was stated that
[t]he type of relationship which would appear to disqualify is one
from which it may not be unreasonable to infer an absence of impartiality, the presence of bias, or the existence of some interest on the part
of the arbitrator in the welfare of one of the parties. 25
However, judicial confusion regarding disclosure remained unresolved
in 1968 when the Supreme Court decided Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.26
Pursuant to a painting contract between Commonwealth Coatings
Corporation (hereinafter Commonwealth) and Samford Overseas, Inc.
(hereinafter Samford), represented in this suit by Continental Casualty
Company, a dispute was submitted to arbitration. Each of the parties
selected an arbitrator, who together selected a neutral arbitrator.
Unknown to Commonwealth, the neutral arbitrator, a prominent engineering consultant from the area, had previously contracted with
Samford, collecting about twelve thousand dollars in fees over a period
of years. This relationship was not disclosed until after the award. Conceding the fairness and impartiality of the neutral arbitrator, Commonwealth moved to have the award set aside on the grounds set forth in
Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act. The district court
refused to vacate the award, and the court of appeals affirmed.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court posed the issue in this manner:
are the "elementary requirements of impartiality taken for granted in
every judicial proceeding . . . suspended when the parties agree to
resolve a dispute through arbitration"? 27 Vacating the award on the
basis of the arbitrator's nondisclosure, the Court inferred from the
broad statutory language of section 1028 a Congressional intent to im24 15 App. Div. 2d 913, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1962).
25Id. at 914, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
26 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
27Id.
28 See

supra note 10.
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pose upon arbitration proceedings such judicial standards of impartiality. Analogizing the failure of the arbitrator to disclose to a similar situation in a judicial proceeding, 29 the Court ruled as a matter of law
that an arbitrator is required to disclose any prior or contemporaneous
relationship with one of the parties which might cast suspicion upon
the proceeding. Such disclosure, while in no way impinging upon the
effectiveness of the arbitral process, would, indeed, supply the safeguard needed to regulate the arbitrator's unbridled discretion. 0
While the majority opinion in Commonwealth might appear to
resolve the confusion concerning disclosure, the concurring opinions'
suggestion that trivial relationships need not be disclosed qualifies the
broad language.3 1 This qualification imposes upon the judiciary the
duty of determining whether the undisclosed relationship is too insubstantial to warrant vacation. The concurring justices contended that
adoption of this rule would facilitate disclosure, without endangering
the arbitrator's status as a disinterested third party. Furthermore, such
frankness at the outset would not only contribute to the functioning
of the process, but would also prevent challenge after the award. Thus,
pre-arbitration disclosure would minimize judicial interference by
permitting the parties, "who are far better informed of the prevailing
ethical standards and reputations within their business," 32 to be the
judges of the arbitrator's impartiality.
The dissent, in a rational refutation of the majority opinion,
examined both the nature of the arbitral process and the objectives of
the arbitration statutes. It found the efficacy of the process in its informality, an advantage which would be negated by the- imposition of
stringent judicial standards. 3 Construing section 10 literally, the dissent
indicated that, absent conduct or events unequivocally inconsistent
34
with a fair and impartial hearing, it would not vacate an award.
Contending that the majority's disclosure standard has "no basis in
applicable statute or jurisprudential principles," 35 the dissent concluded that in the absence of actual partiality, bias or misconduct, an
award is unamenable to judicial interference.
29 The Court referred to Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). The analogy is somewhat
weak since the judicial officer in Tumey had a pecuniary interest in the transaction he was
deciding, whereas in Commonwealth, the arbitrator had nothing to gain financially from
his decision.
3o 393 U.S. at 149.
81 Id. at 151-52 (concurring opinion).
32 Id. at 151 (concurring opinion).
38 Id. at 154-55 (dissenting opinion).
34 Id. at 154 (dissenting opinion).
35 Id. at 153 (dissenting opinion).
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The Commonwealth decision is consistent with earlier arbitration
cases in that it holds the arbitrator to judicial standards. If the arbitraljudicial analogy is valid, Commonwealth is justified, for it is merely a
further extension of the courts' ratiocination. However, by purporting
to set forth an absolute rule requiring neutral arbitrators to disclose
all prior or contemporaneous relationships with any of the parties to
the arbitration proceeding, the majority opinion actually raises two
additional questions. First, is the creation of such a rule properly
within the scope of judicial authority? And secondly, to what extent
will this rule be effectuated?
The majority opinion predicates its argument upon the proposition that arbitration is of a judicial nature. However, there exists a
divergence of opinion as to the propriety of this proposition. Some
commentators have contended that it is merely a legal fiction, fabricated
by the courts in an attempt to oversee arbitration proceedings:
The process of making judges of arbitrators and judicial proceedings of
arbitrations seems to be at its best, when used arguendo to ...

lend

some structure to some set of facts being made up in a given case as
cause for disqualification of the arbitrator, as for insufficient "honesty"
or "impartiality," "undue bias" or "misconduct" . . . .86
In addition, any reference to arbitration or arbitrators as "judicial"
proceedings or officers "is necessarily based upon remote resem37
blances."
8 The parties, in
In reality, arbitration is contractual by nature.3
their submission agreement, provide for the form and procedure they
desire.3 9 They make provisions for the selection of arbitrators and
prescribe the extent of their power. Arbitration is truly self-regulatory
in its operation; yet the Court is now willing to set forth a single
procedural rule requiring disclosure.
It should be reemphasized that the majority opinion found justification for its disclosure rule implicit in the "broad statutory language"
of section 10.- o Yet, the Congressional reports concerning the Arbitration Act indicate that it is merely an enabling act providing for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of
the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement.
36W. Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031, 1047 (1960).
37 Id. at 1045.
38 See M. Dozen, THE LA.w AND PRAcriE OF Comaacum ARHITRATION § 1.01, at 1
(1968); W. Sturges, Arbitration- What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031, 1046 (1960).
39 See 6 S. WrLs=roN, CoNRAcrs § 1928, at 585 (rev. ed. 1938).
40 See supra note 10.
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He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same
41
footing as any other contract, where it belongs.
While section 10 provides for vacation of an award involving corruption, fraud, undue means, or evident partiality, it is dear that its
sole purpose is to insure the impartiality of the proceeding. The
majority opinion concurs'with this interpretation, 42 but utilizes the
section to justify vacation of an award where the impartiality of the
arbitrator is conceded. Thus, the admittedly fair and impartial award
is subjected to vacation solely because of the arbitrator's failure to
43
comply with a technicality which heretofore was not required.
Clearly this was not the intention of Congress. As was stated in the
cogent dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas:
Arbitration is essentially consensual and practical. The United States
Arbitration Act is obviously designed to protect the integrity of the
process with a minimum of insistence upon set formulae and rules.44
The majority validly observed that their disclosure rule was
consistent with the rule adopted by the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter A.A.A.). 45 However, it should be noted that the
A.A.A. rules apply to an arbitration proceeding only when the parties
specifically so provide in their submission agreement. Moreover, as
the dissent indicates, it was not until 1964 that the A.A.A. rules
absolutely required disclosure, since previously, it was merely requested.46 Undoubtedly, as the Court indicated, an adoption of the
A.A.A. rule requiring disclosure would not unduly hamper the effectiveness of the arbitration process. Yet, if the mere failure to comply is to
provide a basis for vacation, the initiative for the imposition of such
a rule should clearly originate in the legislature.
To what extent will Commonwealth resolve the uncertainty
41 H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1925).
42 393 U.S. at 147.
43 Id. at 153.

44 Id. at 154-55.
45 Rule 18 of the A.A.A. provides:
Disclosure by Arbitrator of Disqualification- At the time of receiving his notice of
appointment, the prospective Arbitrator is requested to disclose any circumstances
likely to create a presumption of bias or which he believes might disqualify him as
an impartial Arbitrator. Upon receipt of such information, the Tribunal Clerk
shall immediately disclose it to the parties, who if willing to proceed under the circum.stances disclosed, shall, in writing, so advise the Tribunal Clerk. If either party
declines to waive the presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall be
filled in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Rule.
Id. at 154 n.2. For A.A.A. requirements of an arbitrator concerning disclosure, see M.
DomRsE, THE LAW AND PRACTIcE OF ComMERcIAL ARBITRATION § 21.03, at 208 (1968).
46 393 US. at 154 n.2.
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surrounding an arbitrator's duty to disclose prior or contemporaneous
relations with the parties? While the majority opinion purports to set
forth an absolute rule requiring disclosure, the qualification annexed
by the concurring opinion - that arbitrators need not disclose "trivial
relationships" - will undoubtedly cause much confusion. In the absence of a clear majority47 the concurring opinion carries considerable
weight. As previously indicated, the concurring justices favored disclosure for practical purposes while permitting the arbitrator to decide
whether his relationship with a party was substantial enough to require
disclosure. What, then, is the "trivial relationship" which need not be
disclosed? The arbitrator in Commonwealth was apparently a wealthy
man, and the business he received from the party, twelve thousand
dollars over a four or five year period, would seemingly be trivial. Yet,
the award was vacated.
Thus, no dear answer has really been provided for the critical
question of whether an arbitrator must disclose a prior or contemporaneous relationship with one of the parties to the arbitration
proceeding; the confusion remains, though now centered about the
interpretation of the term "trivial relationship." Only future litigation
will determine whether the disclosure rule of Commonwealth will
endure.
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In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247
N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATIONS. -

Appellant was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for stealing $112
from complainant's pocketbook. This finding was based upon a preponderance of the evidence as required by Section 744(b) of the New
York Family Court Act. The Court of Appeals, in affirming, held that
despite the recent expansion of criminal due process in juvenile hearings, the quantitative test of proof, as prescribed by the statute, was
both correctly applied and constitutional.
Prior to the juvenile court movement in the United States,1 a
47 Commonwealth was decided on a 4-2-3 basis. Thus, a possibility exists that the
Court would refuse to vacate an arbitration award involving non-disclosure of a "trivial"

relationship.
I The first juvenile court act was passed in Illinois in 1899. Law of July 1, 1899, §§ 1-21,
[1899] III. Laws 131-37. See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Ray. 104 (1909).

